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  I present an overview of the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church on usury. In 1515, the 
Fifth Lateran Council defined “the real meaning of usury: when, from its use, a thing which 
produces nothing is applied to the acquiring of gain and profit without any work, any expense or 
any risk.” I argue that the economic conditions of the Middle Ages could not have justified any 
interest, but structural changes to the economy, including the abolition of slavery, inflation, and 
the emergence of markets for investment, justify interest on the basis of default risk, the costs of 
inflation, and opportunity costs. 
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  Much confusion surrounds the teaching of the Roman Catholic Church on the matter of 
usury. One of the more common accusations against the Church’s claim of infallibility is the 
assertion that she has changed her teaching about usury. While faithful Catholics maintain that 
the Church has not changed her teaching, many are confused as to what that teaching is, and 
about what has changed and what has not. This note is an attempt to clarify the issues pertaining 
to the question of usury, as well as to offer some explanations for the confusion and suggest how 
they can be resolved. 
  A proper understanding of the sin of usury is founded in a proper understanding of the 
meaning of justice. Justice is both an attribute of transactions and a virtue of men. As an 
attribute, a transaction satisfies justice if each person receives what is owed to him. Such 
transactions may take two forms: as an exchange of goods between two persons, or as the 
distribution of the goods of a community to its members. Transactions of the first form satisfy 
commutative justice when the value of the goods given is equal to the goods received; 
transactions of the second form satisfy distributive justice when the members receive a share of 
the community goods in proportion to their standing. Men have the virtue of justice when they 
are in the habit of conducting their affairs in accord with justice. 
  St. Thomas Aquinas addresses the sin of usury in the Summa Theologica (II-II.78), in which 
he argues that it is a sin against justice. According to St. Thomas, usury is the charging of any 
amount of interest, and as such it is specifically a sin against commutative justice. The borrowing 
and repayment of money constitute a transaction: a sum of money, the principal, is lent at one point in time to be repaid with interest at a later point in time. The principal is lent, and the 
principal plus interest is repaid. In St. Thomas’ judgment, the two sums are not equal, and thus 
the principal of commutative justice is violated. 
  Several ecumenical councils address various aspects of the question of usury. The Council of 
Nicea in 325 forbids clerics from lending money at any interest rate under pain of explusion from 
the clergy. As this decree is directed at the clergy, it does apply to the laity or the practice of the 
Church as a whole. The Third Lateran Council in 1179 decried the pervasive sin of usury and 
declared that “notorious usurers should not be admitted to communion of the altar or receive 
Christian burial if they die in this sin.” In 1215, the Fourth Lateran Council addresses 
“oppressive and excessive interest” that was apparently being charged by some of the Jews at the 
time and declares that those found guilty of such practices were to be removed from contact with 
Christians until they made restitution. This statement is important because it specifies “excessive 
interest,” making an implicit distinction between excessive and moderate interest and suggesting 
a precedent for the modern definition of usury as excessive interest. Vermeesch observes that 
this is the only canon that makes such a distinction and that “canon law nowhere states distinctly 
that interest is, under any circumstances whatsoever, contrary to justice.” (1912) The Second 
Council of Lyons in 1274 reaffirmed the decree of the Third Lateran Council and increased the 
penalties due to usurers, denying them property on which to conduct their affairs and punishing 
those who aid them with excommunication or interdiction. The Council also sought to suppress 
the apparent practice whereby, in order to receive a Christian burial, notorious usurers would 
specify in their wills that restitution of interest be made to borrowers upon their deaths. 
  The question of usury is also taken up at the Council of Vienne in 1311-12. The Fathers of 
the Council declare that “If indeed someone has fallen into the error of presuming to affirm 
pertinaciously that the practice of usury is not sinful, we decree that he is to be punished as a 
heretic….” (Decree 29) The English translation leaves the particular meaning of what is 
condemned ambiguous. Does this condemnation apply to the taking of any interest, or just to the 
taking of excessive interest? Is it directed at those who admit that the taking of interest could be 
sinful, but is not necessarily so, or is the decree directed at those who declare that the taking of 
interest is never sinful? Additionally, the declaration does not actually condemn those who hold 
the opinion as heretics, but only declares that they should be punished as heretics. This leaves 
open the possibility that the opinion may not be considered heretical, though, obviously, if those who hold the opinion are to be punished as heretics, then the natural conclusion would be that 
they are heretics and that the opinion they hold is heretical. However, there was apparently 
sufficient ambiguity regarding the definition of usury, about what it permitted and what it did 
not, that a dogmatic definition was needed and ultimately provided at the Fifth Lateran Council. 
  In Session 10 of the Fifth Lateran Council on May 4, 1515, the Fathers consider questions 
regarding the reform of credit organizations. The credit organizations in question were Catholic 
credit organizations that had been formed to provide credit to the poor, preventing them from 
turning to other lenders who would use the opportunity to make a profit the expense of the poor. 
The question is raised whether these organizations may charge a fee proportional to the principal, 
i.e. interest, in order to cover the costs of administering the loans. In its response, the Council 
begins its response by dogmatically defining “the real meaning of usury: when, from its use, a 
thing which produces nothing is applied to the acquiring of gain and profit without any work, 
any expense or any risk.” The Council Fathers go on to proclaim that the charging of interest on 
loans in order to cover their cost of administration is morally permissible. In fact, this answer is 
also dogmatically given, 
“[W]e declare and define, with the approval of the sacred council, that the above-mentioned 
credit organisations, established by states and hitherto approved and confirmed by the 
authority of the apostolic see, do not introduce any kind of evil or provide any incentive to 
sin if they receive, in addition to the capital, a moderate sum for their expenses and by way of 
compensation, provided it is intended exclusively to defray the expenses of those employed 
and of other things pertaining (as mentioned) to the upkeep of the organisations, and 
provided that no profit is made therefrom.” 
This declaration clearly states that the charging of interest in order to cover the costs of the loan 
is not sinful. It is not clear from the English translation whether the condition at the end is meant 
to be binding, i.e. whether the charging of interest for profit is sinful. This declaration also does 
not provide clear definitions of either costs or profits, both of which can be used in various ways. 
Economic definitions provided later may clarify the meaning of these terms. The distinction 
between purpose, for profit or not, is the distinction between banks and credit unions: banks are 
owned by shareholders, and direct their efforts to maximize their profits for their shareholders; 
credit unions are nonprofit institutions that lend money to their members, charging only enough fees and interest to cover their costs of operations. From this context, credit unions are in the 
clear, but the moral permissibility of banking remains in doubt. 
  The definition given by the Council is interesting in that it does not identify the sin of usury 
with interest payments as such, but with gain or profit. By definition, interest is a periodic 
payment to a lender that is not considered repayment of principal, and interest payments or the 
sum of the principal and interest payments are usually proportional to the value of the loan. The 
definition of usury says does not restrict the definition of the sin to payments that are either 
periodic or proportional to the value of the loan. Fees, for instance, would be considered usurious 
if they are not justified by work, expense, or risk, even though they may be neither periodic nor 
necessarily proportional to the value of the loan. 
  Also interesting, and perhaps important, is the fact that the Council Fathers do not define 
interest with respect to money, but with respect to any “thing which produces nothing.” From the 
context, it is clear that they believe that money is such a thing, but the question can be asked as 
to whether money can be considered productive. In fact, money is not part of the dogmatic 
definition, allowing for the possibility that money could at one time been considered 
unproductive and at others considered productive. This possibility will remain important for the 
consideration of the modern world. 
  Much has changed in the last five hundred years, but three important changes have 
consequences for the question of usury: the transformation of markets, the abolition of slavery 
and serfdom, and the emergence of inflation. Inflation is the easiest to address, so I will begin 
with it. Inflation is the phenomenon of modern economies where the prices in an economy tend 
to rise together, and occurs when the supply of money increases faster than the demand for 
money. The opposite phenomenon is deflation. Inflation is usually estimated as an average 
increase in prices, though it is often thought of as a uniform increase in prices, i.e. as if all prices 
increase in the same proportion, say 2%, annually. Economics distinguishes between the nominal 
and real values, where the nominal value is the price, i.e. the value in terms of dollars or the local 
currency, and the real value is the price in terms of other goods. With inflation, the real value of 
money is different at different points in time. At 2% inflation, a dollar today would only buy 
about $0.98 worth of goods the next year, and about $0.96 the year after that. The prices of 
goods increase every year, or, equivalently, the price of money in terms of goods, i.e. the real 
value of money, decreases every year.   Inflation occurs in modern economies that use paper money, or “fiat” money, and whose 
supply can be increased or decreased by the government, usually through the actions of the 
central bank. While prices would change in response to local market conditions, persistent 
inflation or deflation did not begin in the United States until about 1960, and would have been 
unknown in the time of St. Thomas Aquinas and the Fifth Lateran Council. The basis of currency 
at those times was not fiat money but precious metals, i.e. gold and silver, so the money supply 
could only increase by the discovery of new mines or other sources of metals, but not by 
government action. As the discovery of new sources of gold was a relatively rare occurrence, at 
least until the discovery of the New World, the money supply would have remained largely 
constant from one year to the next. 
  To reconcile the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas with the phenomenon of inflation is 
straightforward, beginning with the recognition that inflation imposes a cost on to the lender. In 
the presence of inflation, the real value of the principal lent is greater than the principal repaid, 
so some additional must be added to compensate the lender of the difference. If inflation was 
2%, then a 2% interest rate would compensate the lender for the fact that the money with which 
he is repaid is worth less than the money he lent. This raises a point about timing: interest rates 
are set when the loan is made, when inflation is not known but only predicted. It would be 
possible to write a loan contract so the amount of interest charged is not the predicted but the 
actual inflation rate for the years of the loan, i.e. to write an inflation-indexed loan contract, so 
the real value of the money repaid is closer to the real value of the money lent. This may be 
desirable from a moral standpoint, as it would protect the lender from unexpectedly high 
inflation and the borrower from unexpectedly low inflation or deflation. 
  In addition to inflation, a second cost faced by lenders is the risk of default, and this relates to 
slavery and serfdom. In the modern economy, the borrower who defaults on a loan can declare 
bankruptcy, erasing his debts and preventing the lender from ever receiving payment. Prior to the 
abolition of slavery, the borrower had no such protection, and the lender could force the 
defaulting borrower into indentured servitude or slavery, accepting his labor in lieu of the debt. 
In such a system, the risk of default was substantially lower to the lender, as the only way he 
would suffer a total loss would be if the debtor defaulted and was never captured. If the debtor 
was ever captured, he could theoretically be forced to compensate the lender not only for the 
original debt but for the cost of his capture as well, the expense of which would have constituted an additional loss to the lender. Furthermore, given the higher costs of transportation at the time, 
flight risk would have also been substantially lower. 
  In economics, the risk of default constitutes a cost to the lender. For example, consider a 
lender who loans 100 borrowers $1 each, and assume that there is no inflation. If, on average, 
2% of borrowers default each year, then the lender will lose $2 per year on average, and, from 
his original $100, will have only $98 the following year. In the absence of interest, the lender 
would only lose money, and the amount repaid would be less than the amount lent, contrary to 
commutative justice. In order to compensate him for their risk of default, each borrower would 
have to agree to about 2% interest, so that, given the two defaulting borrowers, the lender 
receives the $100 in repayment for the $100 he lent. With the abolition of slavery, the risk of 
default constitutes a real and substantially larger cost to the lenders, so, from the perspective of 
the lenders, they must charge interest to be compensated for the costs of default risk in the order 
to satisfy commutative justice. Here interest can be thought of as an insurance payment to the 
lender to cover default risk. 
  From the perspective of the borrowers, however, the justification of interest as insurance 
payments poses a moral problem, as the borrowers not in default repay more than they borrow to 
compensate for the ones in default. At the time the loan was made, the lender could not be 
certain that they would repay it, and so he charged them interest. However, after they do repay it, 
he knows that they were not credit risks, and yet they are still charged for the costs of default 
imposed by others? In this example, they borrowers are charged interest because they are thought 
to belong to a group, i.e. the credit risks, even though they may not, in fact belong to that group. 
However, it may also be true that the borrowers themselves do not know to which group they 
belong at the time of the loan, i.e. a borrower may end up in default through circumstances he 
could not have foreseen, and this may justify charging them some interest to compensate for the 
risks they pose. 
  The third cost for which lenders may justify interest payments is the opportunity cost of 
money. That is, in the modern economy, the potential lender could lend his money or he could 
invest it for a return, so the interest compensates the lender for the return that he would have 
otherwise made. For example, a lender could lend $100 or invest that $100 in a company that 
makes a 2% return on investment annually. Assume there is no inflation and that there is no 
credit risk. If the lender invests the money, then he will have $102 the following year; if he lends it without interest, then he will only have $100, $2 less than he otherwise could have. Lending 
has cost the lender $2. If the lender had charged 2% interest, then he would have $102 whether 
he lent the money or invested it, and lending it would have cost him nothing. Additionally, the 
logic of economics suggests that, absent moral considerations, then lender will not lend him the 
money unless the borrower agrees to pay 2% interest. Thus a law against interest would have 
prevented the loan from taking place at all. Economic theory considers opportunity cost to the 
lender, but this category comes from economic theory, not natural law, so whether this is a cost 
for which the lender can be compensated according to the understanding of the Fifth Lateran 
Council is a legitimate question. However, I will suggest here that it is. 
  Is opportunity cost a legitimate cost for which lenders may be compensated and charge 
interest according to the teaching of the Church? This would seem to be the case, as this concept 
is implicit the teaching on usufruct and sins of omission. St. Thomas defines usufruct as the right 
to enjoy the use of a thing that “bears fruit.” (II-II.78.3) For instance, land literally bears fruit 
when cultivated, and a house “bears fruit” when it is lived in, as it provides shelter and 
enjoyment so long as it is used. St. Thomas’ discussion assumes that the value of the property 
itself does not deteriorate from the tenant’s use of it. Because of this fruit-bearing property, 
owners may charge rent to tenants for the use of both land and houses for usufruct, where the 
rent is equal to the value of the fruit born by the property while the tenant remains in possession 
of it. However, “if [the owner] exacts more for the usufruct of a thing which has no other use but 
the consumption of its substance, he exacts a price of something non-existent: and so his 
exaction is unjust.” (II-II.78.1) In the language of modern economics, the usufruct is the 
opportunity cost of a piece of property, and rent equal to this cost is necessary to satisfy 
commutative justice. The difference between the teaching on usury and usufruct is that there is a 
positive opportunity cost to property that naturally bears fruit, but, from St. Thomas perspective, 
there is no such cost to property that is naturally barren, such as money. 
  Sins of omission may also be interpreted in terms of opportunity cost. A person commits a 
sin of omission when he does not do something that he ought to do. When, through his inaction, 
a person allows a good to go undone or an evil to be accomplished, he commits a sin of 
omission. The good that is not done or the evil that is are opportunity costs that measure the costs 
of sins of omission from which such sins take their gravity. If the good not done is a great good, 
or the evil is a great evil, then a sin of omission is a mortal sin. In the moral accounting of the conscience, a person must consider both what he did do and what he could have done. In a 
similar manner, a proper accounting of what is owed would consider both what the lender did 
have and what he could have had. This concept seems to have been affirmed in the parables of 
Jesus himself. 
  The concept of opportunity cost is implicit in Jesus’ parable of the talents, which also 
provides one of the clearest justifications for the charging of interest. In the parable, a lord gives 
each of his servants talents, ten to one, five to another, and one to a third, and then leaves for a 
year. Upon his return, he commends those servants who received ten and five for having earned a 
return on his investment, 
“[b]ut he that had received the one talent, came and said: Lord, I know that thou art a hard 
man; thou reapest where thou hast not sown and gatherest where thou hast not strewed. And 
being afraid, I went and hid thy talent in the earth. Behold here thou hast that which is thine. 
And his lord answering, said to him: Wicked and slothful servant, thou knewest that I reap 
where I sow not and gather where I have not strewed. Thou oughtest therefore to have 
committed my money to the bankers: and at my coming I should have received my own with 
usury.” (Matt 25:24-27) 
Here “usury” is understood to mean interest, as I will assume that Jesus is not telling a parable in 
which a servant is held accountable for not having sinned on his lord’s behalf. In the parable, the 
lord is repaid the full amount that he lent to the servant, but he demands more. The servant had 
an opportunity to invest his talent and did not do so, and he failure to gain is considered a loss to 
the lord. The servant is reckoned wicked for having failed to return the principal plus interest, not 
the lord for demanding more than the principal. The servant squandered his opportunity at a cost 
of interest to his lord, and in doing so committed an injustice. 
  If opportunity costs are legitimate costs, then why did St. Thomas teach that any interest was 
sinful? Rent is to property as interest is to money, but why is rent be morally permissible and 
interest not? If money does not bear fruit, then why would it not be exchanged for property that 
does? In the one case, rent, in the form of interest, could not be charged for use of the former, but 
could be charged for the use of the latter. If interest were unlawful, then those in the possession 
of money would make exactly just such an exchange, reasoning that it is better to earn rent on 
their money than it is to earn nothing. In such an economy, while money does not directly bear 
fruit, it does so indirectly by storing the value of property that does, and lending it would bear an opportunity cost. The effect a law against interest would be to foreclose the market for loans, for 
lenders cannot recover their opportunity costs by charging interest, so potential borrowers would 
be unable to find willing lenders. If this argument is sound, then why does St. Thomas Aquinas 
not address it?  
  The reason that St. Thomas does not address the opportunity cost argument may be because 
an opportunity costs presumes the existence of an opportunity, and, in the absence of modern 
markets, such opportunities could not be assumed to exist. The forgoing argument relied on the 
assumption that a property that bore fruit could be purchased by a potential lender, which 
implicitly assumes that a market exists for such property. However, if such markets do not exist, 
then such a purchase could not be made, and the lender would suffer no opportunity cost in 
loaning his money. 
  It is possible that markets for investments, and therefore opportunity costs to lending, could 
not be assumed to exist at the time of both St. Thomas Aquinas and the Fifth Lateran Council.  
The general structure of the economy in those times would have been in the form of manorial 
estates. Trade was greatly reduced both because these estates were largely self-sufficient and 
because of the high costs of transportation. A manorial estate would have a quantity of money on 
hand, but it would not need to employ this on a day-to-day basis. Market activity would be 
sporadic, when merchants would arrive in town or at specified times of the year. This is no 
longer the case in the modern economy, where markets can be characterized as continuous. 
Technological innovation lowered shipping costs and extended the market, and it is exactly this 
transformation of the economy about which Adam Smith writes in The Wealth of Nations. 
Importantly, in the modern economy, markets for investment exist continuously, so opportunities 
to invest money that could otherwise be lent are always present. Some compensation for 
opportunity costs is therefore justified in the modern economy, whereas it would not be justified 
in a feudal economy. 
  Together, these costs clarify a consistent teaching on the sin of usury. Usury is the sin of 
forcing borrowers to pay money for nothing. In the feudal economy, when the costs of 
administering a loan, inflation, default risk, and opportunity cost were zero, or nearly so, any 
interest was considered unjustified, and so any interest was considered usury. In the modern 
economy, when the costs of administering a loan, inflation, default risk, and opportunity cost are 
not zero, some compensation in the form of interest or other fees is justified, but not without limit. Specifically, payments to compensate for these costs are justified, but interest payments or 
other fees in excess of these costs are unjustified, and therefore usurious. 
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First Council of Nicea, 325 
 
Canon 17 
Since many enrolled [among the clergy] have been induced by greed and avarice to forget the 
sacred text, "who does not put out his money at interest", and to charge one per cent [a month] on 
loans, this holy and great synod judges that if any are found after this decision to receive interest 
by contract or to transact the business in any other way or to charge [a flat rate of] fifty per cent 
or in general to devise any other contrivance for the sake of dishonourable gain, they shall be 
deposed from the clergy and their names struck from the roll. 
 
 
Third Lateran Council 
 
Canon 25 
Nearly everywhere the crime of usury has become so firmly rooted that many, omitting other 
business, practise usury as if it were permitted, and in no way observe how it is forbidden in both 
the Old and New Testament. We therefore declare that notorious usurers should not be admitted 
to communion of the altar or receive Christian burial if they die in this sin. Whoever receives 
them or gives them Christian burial should be compelled to give back what he has received, and 
let him remain suspended from the performance of his office until he has made satisfaction 
according to the judgment of his own bishop. 
 
 
Fourth Lateran Council, 1215 
 
Constitution 67 
The more the Christian religion is restrained from usurious practices, so much the more does the 
perfidy of the Jews grow in these matters, so that within a short time they are exhausting the 
resources of Christians. Wishing therefore to see that Christians are not savagely oppressed by 
Jews in this matter, we ordain by this synodal decree that if Jews in future, on any pretext, extort 
oppressive and excessive interest from Christians, then they are to be removed from contact with 
Christians until they have made adequate satisfaction for the immoderate burden. Christians too, 
if need be, shall be compelled by ecclesiastical censure, without the possibility of an appeal, to 
abstain from commerce with them. We enjoin upon princes not to be hostile to Christians on this 
account, but rather to be zealous in restraining Jews from so great oppression. We decree, under 
the same penalty, that Jews shall be compelled to make satisfaction to churches for tithes and 
offerings due to the churches, which the churches were accustomed to receive from Christians 
for houses and other possessions, before they passed by whatever title to the Jews, so that the 
churches may thus be preserved from loss. 
 
 
Second Council of Lyons, 1274 
 
Constitution 26 Wishing to close up the abyss of usury, which devours souls and swallows up property, we order 
under threat of the divine malediction that the constitution of the Lateran council against usurers 
be inviolably observed. Since the less convenient it is for usurers to lend, the more their freedom 
to practise usury is curtailed, we ordain by this general constitution as follows. Neither a college, 
nor other community, nor an individual person, of whatever dignity, condition or status, may 
permit those foreigners and others not originating from their territories, who practise usury or 
wish to do so, to rent houses for that purpose or to occupy rented houses or to live elsewhere. 
Rather, they must expel all such notorious usurers from their territories within three months, 
never to admit any such for the future. Nobody is to let houses to them for usury, nor grant them 
houses under any other title. Those indeed who act otherwise, if they are ecclesiastical persons, 
patriarchs, archbishops or bishops, are to know that they incur automatic suspension; lesser 
individual persons, excommunication, colleges or other communities, interdict. If they remain 
obdurate throughout a month, their territories shall lie henceforth under ecclesiastical interdict as 
long as the usurers remain there. Furthermore, if they are layfolk, they are to be restrained from 
such transgression through their ordinaries by ecclesiastical censure, all privileges ceasing. 
 
Constitution 27 
Although notorious usurers give orders in their wills that restitution be made for their usurious 
gains, either in express terms or in general, ecclesiastical burial is nevertheless to be refused until 
full restitution has been made as far as the usurer's means allow, or until a pledge has been given 
of fitting restitution. This pledge is to be given to those to whom restitution is due, if they 
themselves or others who can receive for them are present. If they are absent, the pledge is to be 
given to the local ordinary or his vicar or the rector of the parish where the testator lives, in the 
presence of trustworthy persons from the parish (the ordinary, vicar and rector, as just 
mentioned, shall have permission to receive such pledge in their name by authority of the present 
constitution, so that these ecclesiastics have the right to action). The pledge may also be given to 
a public servant commissioned by the ordinary. If the sum owing from usury is openly known, 
we wish this sum always to be expressed in the pledge, if the amount is not clearly known, the 
sum is to be determined by the receiver of the pledge. The receiver must make his estimate at not 
less than the probable amount; if he does otherwise, he is obliged to restitution for anything still 
owing. We decree that all religious and others who presume to grant ecclesiastical burial to 
notorious usurers, contrary to this decree, are subject to the penalty promulgated against usurers 
at the Lateran council. Nobody is to assist at the wills of notorious usurers or hear their 
confessions or absolve them, unless they have made restitution for their usury or have given a 
fitting guarantee, as far as they can, as described above. The wills made in any other way by 
notorious usurers have no validity, but are by law null and void. 
 
 
Council of Vienne, 1311-12 
 
Decree 29 
Serious suggestions have been made to us that communities in certain places, to the divine 
displeasure and injury of the neighbour, in violation of both divine and human law, approve of 
usury. By their statutes, sometimes confirmed by oath, they not only grant that usury may be 
demanded and paid, but deliberately compel debtors to pay it. By these statutes they impose 
heavy burdens on those claiming the return of usurious payments, employing also various pretexts and ingenious frauds to hinder the return. We, therefore, wishing to get rid of these 
pernicious practices, decree with the approval of the sacred council that all the magistrates, 
captains, rulers, consuls, judges, counsellors or any other officials of these communities who 
presume in the future to make, write or dictate such statutes, or knowingly decide that usury be 
paid or, if paid, that it be not fully and freely restored when claimed, incur the sentence of 
excommunication. They shall also incur the same sentence unless within three months they 
delete from the books of their communities, if they have the power, statutes of this kind hitherto 
published, or if they presume to observe in any way these statutes or customs. Furthermore, since 
money-lenders for the most part enter into usurious contracts so frequently with secrecy and 
guile that they can be convicted only with difficulty, we decree that they be compelled by 
ecclesiastical censure to open their account books, when there is question of usury. If indeed 
someone has fallen into the error of presuming to affirm pertinaciously that the practice of usury 
is not sinful, we decree that he is to be punished as a heretic; and we strictly enjoin on local 
ordinaries and inquisitors of heresy to proceed against those they find suspect of such error as 
they would against those suspected of heresy. 
 
 
Fifth Lateran Council 
 
Session 10, May 4, 1515 
[On the reform of credit organisations (Montes pietatis)] 
 
  Leo, bishop, servant of the servants of God, with the approval of the sacred council, for an 
everlasting record. We ought to give first place in our pastoral office, among our many anxious 
cares, to ensuring that what is healthy, praiseworthy, in keeping with the christian faith, and in 
harmony with good customs may be not only clarified in our time but also made known to future 
generations, and that what could offer matter for scandal be totally cut down, wholly uprooted 
and nowhere permitted to spread, while at the same time permitting those seeds to be planted in 
the Lord's field and in the vineyard of the Lord of hosts which can spiritually feed the minds of 
the faithful, once the cockle has been uprooted and the wild olive cut down. Indeed, we have 
learnt that among some of our dear sons who were masters in theology and doctors of civil and 
canon law, there has recently broken out again a particular controversy, not without scandal and 
disquiet for ordinary people, with regard to the relief of the poor by means of loans made to them 
by public authorities. They are popularly called credit organisations and have been set up in 
many cities of Italy by the magistrates of the cities and by other Christians, to assist by this kind 
of loan the lack of resources among the poor lest they be swallowed up by the greed of usurers 
They have been praised and encouraged by holy men, preachers of God's word, and approved 
and confirmed also by a number of our predecessors as popes, to the effect that the said credit 
organisations are not out of harmony with christian dogma, even though there is controversy and 
different opinions regarding the question. 
  Some of these masters and doctors say that the credit organisations are unlawful. After a 
fixed period of time has passed, they say, those attached to these organisations demand from the 
poor to whom they make a loan so much per pound in addition to the capital sum. For this reason 
they cannot avoid the crime of usury or injustice, that is to say a clearly defined evil, since our 
Lord, according to Luke the evangelist, has bound us by a clear command that we ought not to 
expect any addition to the capital sum when we grant a loan. For, that is the real meaning of usury: when, from its use, a thing which produces nothing is applied to the acquiring of gain and 
profit without any work, any expense or any risk. The same masters and doctors add that in these 
credit organisations neither commutative nor distributive justice is observed, even though 
contracts of this kind, if they are to be duly approved, ought not to go beyond the bounds of 
justice. They endeavour to prove this on the grounds that the expenses of the maintenance of 
these organisations, which ought to be paid by many persons (as they say), are extracted only 
from the poor to whom a loan is made; and at the same time certain other persons are given more 
than their necessary and moderate expenses (as they seem to imply), not without an appearance 
of evil and an encouragement to wrongdoing .  
  But many other masters and doctors say the opposite and, both in writing and in speech, unite 
in speaking in many of the schools in Italy in defence of so great a benefit and one so necessary 
to the state, on the grounds that nothing is being sought nor hoped for from the loan as such. 
Nevertheless, they argue, for the compensation of the organisations -- that is, to defray the 
expenses of those employed and of all the things necessarily pertaining to the upkeep of the said 
organisations -- they may lawfully ask and receive, in addition to the capital, a moderate and 
necessary sum from those deriving benefit from the loan, provided that no profit is made 
therefrom. This is in virtue of the rule of law that the person who experiences benefit ought also 
to meet the charge, especially when there is added the support of the apostolic authority. They 
point out that this opinion was approved by our predecessors of happy memory, the Roman 
pontiffs Paul II, Sixtus IV, Innocent VIII, Alexander VI and Julius II, as well as by saints and 
persons devoted to God and held in high esteem for their holiness, and has been preached in 
sermons about the gospel truth .  
  We wish to make suitable arrangements on this question (in accord with what we have 
received from on high). We commend the zeal for justice displayed by the former group, which 
desires to prevent the opening up of the chasm of usury, as well as the love of piety and truth 
shown by the latter group, which wishes to aid the poor, and indeed the earnestness of both sides. 
Since, therefore, this whole question appears to concern the peace and tranquility of the whole 
christian state, we declare and define, with the approval of the sacred council, that the above-
mentioned credit organisations, established by states and hitherto approved and confirmed by the 
authority of the apostolic see, do not introduce any kind of evil or provide any incentive to sin if 
they receive, in addition to the capital, a moderate sum for their expenses and by way of 
compensation, provided it is intended exclusively to defray the expenses of those employed and 
of other things pertaining (as mentioned) to the upkeep of the organisations, and provided that no 
profit is made therefrom. They ought not, indeed, to be condemned in any way. Rather, such a 
type of lending is meritorious and should be praised and approved. It certainly should not be 
considered as usurious; it is lawful to preach the piety and mercy of such organisations to the 
people, including the indulgences granted for this purpose by the holy apostolic see; and in the 
future, with the approval of the apostolic see, other similar credit organisations can be 
established. It would, however, be much more perfect and more holy if such credit organisations 
were completely gratuitous: that is, if those establishing them provided definite sums with which 
would be paid, if not the total expenses, then at least half the wages of those employed by the 
organisations, with the result that the debt of the poor would be lightened thereby. We therefore 
decree that Christ's faithful ought to be prompted, by a grant of substantial indulgences, to give 
aid to the poor by providing the sums of which we have spoken, m order to meet the costs of the 
organisations .    It is our will that all religious as well as ecclesiastical and secular persons who henceforth 
dare to preach or argue otherwise by word or in writing, contrary to the sense of the present 
declaration and sanction, incur the punishment of immediate excommunication, notwithstanding 
any kind of privilege, things said above, constitutions and orders of the apostolic see, and 
anything else to the contrary .  
 